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Abstract—Distributed systems often face transient errors and
localized component degradation and failure. Verifying that the
overall system remains healthy in the face of such failures is
challenging. At Netflix, we have built a platform for automatically
generating and executing chaos experiments, which check how
well the production system can handle component failures and
slowdowns. This paper describes the platform and our experi-
ences operating it.
Index Terms—chaos engineering, fault injection, distributed
systems, experimentation
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a service delivered to users over the Internet. All
such services are implemented as distributed systems. The
smallest such service would involve two machines (a single
client and server), while the larger ones, such as Netflix, are
composed of thousands of servers.
Large-scale distributed systems contain many failure modes,
as there are many opportunities for individual component
failures and unexpected interactions among components [1].
To ensure that a system remains available to users, engineers
build resiliency into the system through strategies such as
timeouts, retries, and fallbacks [2].
Ideally, a distributed system will degrade gracefully if
an individual component runs into trouble. In general, it is
difficult to know whether engineering resiliency mechanisms
will actually work to keep the overall system healthy if some
part of the system goes bad.
Chaos engineering [3], [4] is an emerging approach in
industry to evaluate the resiliency of a distributed system by
running experiments against the system, in production. These
experiments can identify weaknesses that could lead to outages
if left unchecked.
At Netflix, we have developed a platform to automate the
generation and execution of chaos experiments. These exper-
iments run directly against our production environment. The
authors are all members of the Resilience Engineering team,
which is a centralized team that develops chaos engineering
tools. In this paper, we discuss the design of our system and
our experiences operating it. This platform was built in about
three years by a team whose size varied between one and four
software engineers.
II. CONTEXT: NETFLIX
A. Overview
Netflix is a service that enables customers to stream tele-
vision shows and movies over the Internet, on a variety of
different types of devices, such as smart TVs, set-top boxes,
smartphones, tablets, laptops, and game consoles.
One of the most important key performance indicators for
Netflix is availability. In our context, we consider the system
to be available if users are successfully able to stream video
on their devices. We usually express service availability as a
percentage of users who are successfully able to stream video,
over some interval of time. For example: 99.99% availability
(“four nines”) means, roughly, that 99.99% of the time, when
a user tried to start watching a video, they were successful.
While Netflix does not have the same availability require-
ments as, say, a telecommunications company, availability is
still important for the business: if customers experience service
interruptions, they are more likely to cancel their subscriptions.
B. Microservice architecture
From the perspective of the end-user, Netflix is a single ser-
vice. Internally, Netflix is implemented using a microservice
architecture [5]: a collection of services1 that communicate
with each other via remote procedure call (RPC). Fig. 1 shows
a Vizceral [6] visualization of a microservice architecture,
where each node represents a cluster of servers that make up a
single service, and requests, referred to collectively as traffic,
flow through the system from left to right.
Many features that Netflix exposes to users are localized to
specific services. For example, Netflix allows users to search
for a specific title: this functionality is implemented by the
search service. Fig. 2, which shows a screen shot of part of the
Netflix user interface, demonstrates how the user interface is
assembled from the output of different microservices. There is
one service that is responsible for presenting the match score,
another one for showing metadata about the video stream (HD,
5.1), and another one that will process the results if a user
clicks the ”Rate this title” option and give the title a thumbs
up or thumbs down.
Netflix uses a microservice architecture to improve velocity:
services are owned by different teams, and each team can
deploy a service independently, without needing to coordinate
with other teams. A microservice architecture can also increase
availability by reducing the size of fault domains: if one
service gets into a bad state, it doesn’t necessarily put the
overall system into a bad state. For example, if the service that
1For the remainder of this paper, we use the term service to refer to a
microservice.
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Fig. 1. A visualization of a microservice architecture
Fig. 2. Screen shot of the top-left corner Netflix UI. Note that information
such as the match score (99% Match), and the badges which show video and
audio metadata (HD, 5.1) are retrieved from different microservices.
processes user rating fails, the overall system should handle
that failure gracefully and the user should not even notice that
this service has failed.
C. Resilience through timeouts, retries, and fallbacks
The Netflix control plane operates in an unforgiving en-
vironment: one of constant change within a public cloud. In
this type of environment, there are many potential sources of
failure, stemming from the infrastructure itself (e.g., degraded
hardware, transient networking problem) or, more often, be-
cause of some change deployed by Netflix engineers that did
not have the intended effect.
Three of the strategies that Netflix employs to achieve
resilience are timeouts, retries, and fallbacks. All RPCs are
configured with timeouts. An RPC might time out for a
number of reasons, including problems with the particular
server being called (e.g., server is overloaded) or problems
with the networking infrastructure.
Many failures are either transient or isolated to a specific
server, which means that a retry to a different server can often
resolve the situation. However, not all problems are transient:
if a bad code push results in a downstream service being
in a bad state (e.g., returning errors for all requests), then a
retry will not resolve the situation. In these cases, we rely on
fallbacks, which is a sensible default response. For example,
if we cannot suggest a row of viewables that are personalized
for an individual user, we can fall back by serving a row of
viewables that are not personalized (e.g., what is currently
popular on Netflix). Fallbacks enable the system to degrade
gracefully when encountering localized failures.
Many Netflix services use the Java-based Hystrix [7] library
to implement fallbacks and the circuit breaker pattern [2].
The Hystrix library has the notion of commands. A Hystrix
command is a wrapper around logic that can potentially fail.
A common Hystrix use case is to wrap a call for an RPC
client. The Hystrix command can be configured to support
timeouts, and fallbacks to handle errors. Hystrix commands
are multithreaded: by default, a Hystrix command is associated
with a threadpool with ten threads.
One of the challenges with timeouts and fallbacks is that
these behaviors are not exercised as frequently as the happy
path, which means we have less confidence they will work
as expected. This is one of the key motivations for the
development of the Chaos Automation Platform.
III. CHAP
A. Overview
We have developed a system called the Chaos Automation
Platform (ChAP) [8] for running chaos engineering experi-
ments within the Netflix microservice architecture.
Most ChAP experiments focus on evaluating whether the
overall system would remain healthy if one of the services
degraded. Two failure modes we focus on are a service
becoming slower (increase in response latency) or a service
failing outright (returning errors). The service-level view of
failure is useful because many different types of faults can
be modeled as a service slowing down or returning errors.
In particular, many bad code pushes (deployment of code
with defects) can be modeled as a service that returns errors,
and many forms of resource exhaustion (e.g., CPU, threads,
memory, network bandwidth) can be modeled as a service
slowing down.
ChAP is effectively an orchestration system that interacts
with a number of internal Netflix services in order to carry
out experiments. ChAP leverages a fault2 injection system
developed inside of Netflix called FIT [9], which does fault
injection at the application level. FIT takes advantage of the
fact that applications deployed inside of the Netflix control
plane use a common set of Java libraries. These libraries have
hooks in them that enable us to inject faults at runtime.
Fault injection is typically done by annotating incoming
requests with metadata that indicate that a call should be failed.
This metadata is passed along as requests propagate through
the system.
FIT supports two types of fault injection:
• failure - throw an exception instead of executing the call
2 In this paper, we sometimes use fault and failure interchangeably, which
is consistent with the Chaos Engineering industry community usage.
• latency - add latency before executing the call
FIT supports injection into a number of different libraries,
including RPC clients (both REST and gRPC), Hystrix [7],
EVcache [10], and Cassandra database clients.
B. Motivating example: failing the bookmarks service
To understand what ChAP does, we’ll walk through an
example experiment. There is a service, which we’ll call
bookmarks, which is responsible for keeping track of where a
user when they previously watched a video. For example, if
you previously watched 45 minutes of the romantic comedy
“Set it up”, quit the Netflix app, and then returned to watch, the
bookmarks service is responsible for identifying the location
in the video to continue watching from.
The bookmarks service adds value for users, but it is not
essential to the functioning of the overall system. If the
bookmarks service failed, then we would still expect that users
would be able to use the service and watch videos: they simply
wouldn’t be able to continue from the last place where they
watched.
Our hypothesis is that users should still be able to stream
video when the bookmarks service fails. We can test this
hypothesis by running an experiment where we intentionally
cause the bookmarks service to fail for a sample of the user
population, and verify that this sample of users are still able
to stream videos successfully.
Although ChAP supports both server-side and client-side
RPC fault injection, in our experiments we generally inject
faults into the RPC clients: the service that is the subject of
the experiment is the caller upstream of the service that we
intend to fail. In this example, the API service [11] is the
upstream that calls the bookmarks service.
For this example, we’ll assume that the API cluster contains
180 servers. We also assume that the experiment will impact
1% of users. This means that we will select randomly select
1% of active users to be in the experiment (treatment) group.
We will also randomly select 1% of users to be in the control
group. Fig. 3 depicts some of the internal Netflix services
that ChAP must orchestrate to run an experiment. A ChAP
experiment in progress is depicted in Fig. 6.
C. Define the experiment
The user, a Netflix engineer, creates an experiment using
the ChAP UI 1©. In this case, the experiment is: fail RPCs to
the bookmark service and verify the system in general and the
API service in particular remain healthy.
The user specifies:
• Failure scenario: fail calls to the bookmark service
• Service to observe: API
D. Create the baseline and canary clusters
ChAP first calls out to Spinnaker [12] 2©. Spinnaker is
Netflix’s continuous delivery system. Spinnaker serves as
an interface for two important services: Amazon EC2 and
Netflix’s internal dynamic properties system.
Fig. 3. ChAP service interactions. The dashed rectangle shows the system boundary of interest: elements outside of the boundary (e.g., Amazon EC2) are
outside of the system. For the purposes of this diagram, we considered Netflix devices as outside of the system. The callouts (e.g. 1©) are explained in the
text.
Netflix engineers use Spinnaker’s web-based user interface
(UI) to define deployment pipelines for deploying their ser-
vices onto Amazon EC2. Netflix engineers also use Spin-
naker’s UI as an interface into Netflix’s internal dynamic prop-
erties system. Netflix services support dynamic configuration:
configuration properties can be changed at runtime through
Spinnaker.
ChAP uses Spinnaker to make requests against Amazon
EC2 4© to provision two smaller copies of the API cluster
inside of the Netflix control plane 5© . These clusters are
referred to as the “baseline” and “canary” clusters. Traffic from
users in the control group will be routed to the baseline cluster,
and traffic from users in the experiment group will be routed to
the canary cluster. We borrow the baseline/canary terminology
from canary deployments [13]. Spinnaker is also used to copy
any dynamic configuration settings from the original cluster to
the baseline and canary 3©. The dynamic configuration settings
are copied before creating the new clusters so that the settings
are in place before the new instances boot.
We size the baseline and canary clusters to be 1% of the
size of the original cluster, in this example that corresponds
to two servers per cluster.
Netflix services use routing identifiers called VIPs (virtual
IPs) [2]. VIPs are strings which behave similarly to DNS
hostnames. Servers advertise VIPs to Eureka [14], the service
discovery service. RPC clients query Eureka to translate a VIP
into a list of IP addresses. The baseline and canary clusters are
each configured to advertise a VIP that is different from the
original cluster. For example, if the servers in the original API
cluster advertise the VIP api, then the baseline cluster would
be assigned the VIP api-chap-baseline and the canary
cluster would be assigned the VIP api-chap-canary.
Because the RPC clients upstream of API are only configured
to call out to the api VIP, the baseline and canary clusters
do not receive any traffic when they first come up.
E. Start low-latency monitoring job
As will be discussed in more detail in Section III-G, ChAP
relies on the Atlas [15] telemetry system as a source for many
of the dashboard graphs as well as the final analysis of the
experimental results.
However, the most recent data we can reliably query from
Atlas is typically five minutes old. If an experiment has
revealed a significant vulnerability and customers are being
severely impacted, we wish to detect this as soon as possible
so we can abort the experiment.
In order to obtain lower latency telemetry data on critical
business metrics that indicate whether customers are being
impacted, we rely on an internal stream processing system
called Mantis [16].
Mantis is a platform that allows Netflix engineers to define
jobs that consume events that are generated by different
microservices. ChAP starts a Mantis [16] job 6© which keeps
a count of the number of successful and failed video start play
and download events, for users in both the baseline and canary
groups. The Mantis job sends this data back to ChAP once a
second. The latency of this data is on the order of seconds
rather than minutes.
F. Sample from users, configure routing and fault injection
ChAP publishes an event through an internal data publishing
and subscription (pub/sub) service to indicate that the experi-
ment should begin.
The event contains the following information:
Data Example
Experiment size 1% of users
Failure to inject fail calls to the bookmarks
service
VIP of original cluster api
VIP of baseline cluster api-baseline
VIP of canary cluster api-canary
Zuul [17] is the front door to the Netflix control plane. It is a
reverse-proxy service that receives all inbound requests from
Netflix devices and routes the traffic into the control plane.
Zuul also supports the notion of filters, which are functions
that can be added to Zuul in order to perform processing on
incoming requests. The Resilience Engineering team owns a
Zuul filter which provides the functionality required for doing
ChAP experiments, as described below:
The ChAP Zuul filter receives the event published by ChAP
7© and randomly assigns 1% of users to the baseline group,
and 1% of users to the canary group.
If an end-user is selected to be part of the baseline
group, then all requests associated with that user will be
annotated with a header with the following routing rule:
api → api-baseline.
Any RPC client that is configured to make calls to the api
VIP will instead make the call to api-baseline VIP. This
will ensure that the users in the baseline group have their traffic
routed to the api-baseline cluster.
If an end-user is selected to be part of the canary group, then
all requests associated with that user will be annotated with a
header with the following routing rule: api→ api-canary
In addition, all requests will be annotated with a header with
the following fault injection rule: fail calls to the bookmark
service. Any RPC client configured to call the bookmarks
service will instead return an error.
Zuul emits a Mantis event for each request. When a request
involves an end-user that has been selected to be a member of
the baseline or canary group, this event is consumed by the
ChAP Mantis job 8©, which keeps track of which end-users
are in the baseline and canary groups.
Other services in the Netflix control plane emit events that
are associated with “start play” events (successes, errors).
These events are also consumed by the ChAP Mantis job:
if a relevant event is associated with a user in a baseline or
canary group, then the relevant metric counter is incremented.
G. Display dashboard
Once the experiment starts, the user is presented with a
dashboard which plots relevant metrics 10©. Netflix relies on
two internal system for generating operational dashboards:
Atlas and Lumen.
Atlas [15] is a telemetry platform for collecting and graph-
ing time-series data in order to provide operational insight.
Netflix engineers often interact with Atlas using a user inter-
face called AtlasUI that allows users to generate graphs using
either a graphical user interface or through a custom query
language called Atlas Stack Language.
AtlasUI is useful for ad hoc generation of individual graphs,
but engineers typically want to view a collection of previously
specified graphs on a single page. Lumen [18] is a platform
that allows Netflix engineers to generate dashboards based on
graphs generated by the Atlas back-end.
ChAP uses Lumen dashboards for displaying metrics data.
This data is used to determine whether or not the injected
faults had a negative impact on system health.
There are two main classes of metrics we use to determine
whether the injected fault has had a negative impact on system
health:
• key performance indicators (KPIs) for the users in the
canary group versus the baseline group
• health metrics for the canary cluster versus the baseline
cluster
The key performance indicators we are concerned with are
around the ability of users to be able to stream video. In
particular, we track a count of stream-starts per second (SPS),
which is a count of the number of successful video stream
starts. We collect SPS counts from both the server side and the
device side, and we also track SPS errors, as shown in Fig. 4.
Note that because error counts are generally much lower than
success counts, it is much more likely that the error counts
differ between the two groups due to random variation.
We also compare health metrics between the baseline and
canary deployments. We examine metrics such as request rate,
latency, error rate, and CPU utilization. One example, CPU
utilization, is shown in in Fig. 5.
H. Monitor ongoing experiment
ChAP monitors the experiment as it runs to verify that there
is no significant negative impact to customers. See Section IV
for more details.
I. Cleanup
Once the experiment has completed, ChAP unpublishes the
experiment event to stop Zuul from re-routing traffic and
injecting faults. ChAP makes calls against Spinnaker to tear
down the baseline and canary clusters.
J. Analyze the results
Finally, ChAP calls out to Kayenta [19] 11©, Netflix’s au-
tomated canary analysis system. Netflix engineers often use
canary deployments to verify that new code being pushed to
production has not introduced a regression. Kayenta performs
Fig. 4. Example graph from the dashboard generated by ChAP. This one
shows one of the KPIs for the users in the baseline (control) and experiment
(canary) group. The specific KPI shown here is the cumulative percentage
of startplay errors reported by the client device. The area shaded in green
indicates the time when fault injection is active. The y axis is intentionally
obscured here to hide proprietary information.
Fig. 5. CPU utilization (%) is one of health metrics tracked in experiments.
a statistical analysis of metrics collected from a canary cluster
and compares it to a baseline cluster, in order to determine
whether there has been a statistically significant impact on
any metrics of interest.
ChAP leverages Kayenta to perform an automated analysis
of the relevant metrics for a chaos engineering experiment.
While Kayenta was originally designed for evaluating the
health of canary deployments, we found it to be an excellent
match for analyzing the results of ChAP experiments.
IV. SAFETY MECHANISMS
Because ChAP experiments involve fault injection, every
experiment carries risk that it could lead to an incident.
To mitigate this risk, we have built in a number of safety
mechanisms that limit the blast radius of an experiment.
Business hours. ChAP experiments only run during busi-
ness hours: weekdays from 9AM to 5PM. This ensures that if
something does go wrong, then engineers are likely to be at
work and can respond more quickly than if there was an issue
after hours.
Automatic stop. If ChAP detects excessive customer impact
during an experiment, then it will stop the experiment early.
This customer impact test is a cruder test than the non-
parametric statistical tests used by Kayenta, but it limits the
harm in the case where an experiment might have significant
impact on affected users.
Total traffic. The set of all concurrently executing ChAP
experiments cannot impact more than 5% of the total traffic, in
any one of the three geographical regions that Netflix servers
run in.
Failover. The Netflix control plane is deployed in three
different Amazon geographical regions. If there is a problem
with one of the regions, Netflix engineers can evacuate traffic
from the troubled region and redirect it to the other two
regions, a process we refer to as failover [20]. ChAP does
not permit experiments to run during a failover as a safety
mechanism, since a failover can violate assumptions that
ChAP makes about the number of requests that are flowing
through a region.
V. MONOCLE
In designing ChAP, we considered two models of usage:
• a self-serve model where engineers define and run their
own experiments.
• a fully automated model where a centralized team defines
and runs experiments.
We initially adopted a self-serve model, where users were
responsible for defining their own experiments. ChAP inte-
grated with the Spinnaker deployment system so that users
could add ChAP experiments to their deployment pipelines,
but users were responsible for setting this up themselves.
Later, we transitioned to a hybrid approach where we would
automatically generate and run experiments, as well as support
users in running self-serve experiments.
We developed an additional service called Monocle that has
two functions, introspecting services and generating experi-
ments.
VI. SERVICE INTROSPECTION
Monocle introspects Netflix services to collect information
about its dependencies. Here, a dependency refers to either a
configured RPC client or a Hystrix command.
Monocle integrates data from multiple sources: the teleme-
try system (Atlas [15]), the tracing system (based on Dapper
[21]) and by querying running servers directly for configura-
tion information such as timeout values.
Fig. 6. ChAP experiment injecting failure into bookmarks from API
Fig. 7. Monocle UI for RPC dependencies within a cluster
Monocle provides a UI which summarizes information
about dependencies. For each Hystrix command, Monocle
displays:
• The percentage of inbound requests that trigger an invo-
cation of the Hystrix command.
• Whether it is believed to be safe to fail
• Whether it is configured with a fallback
• Configured timeouts
• Observed latencies over the past two weeks (mean, P90,
P99, P99.5)3
• Thread pool size
• Observed number of active threads over the past two
weeks
• Which RPC clients it wraps, if any
• Any known impacts associated with the Hystrix command
The Monocle UI provides a tabular view from Monocle of
3P90 stands for “90th percentile”
a list of Hystrix commands
We use heuristics such as the presence of a configured
fallback and telemetry data that shows that the fallback has
succeeded when executed. When accessing this view, users
have the ability to toggle back-and-forth between viewing all
of the Hystrix commands for a cluster or viewing all the RPC
dependencies for a cluster.
Yellow and red attention icons show tooltips when moused
over, and provide additional details around warnings and
vulnerabilities. For example, mousing over red tooltip reveals
the following message:
Warning: Hystrix Command Timeout is Misaligned
with RPC client.
Timeout (1000 ms) is less than the max computed
timeout of the wrapped RPC client (4000 ms). This
means that Hystrix will give up waiting on RPC.
This may be OK for non-critical calls, but you
should review the config settings to confirm the
desired behavior.
For each RPC Client, Monocle shows:
• Timeout and retry configurations
• The percentage of inbound requests that trigger an RPC
call
• Maximum observed invocation rate (requests per second)
over the past two weeks
• Which Hystrix commands wrap it, if any, and if they are
safe to fail
• Any known impacts associated with the RPC client or
the Hystrix commands that wrap it
Fig. 7 shows a tabular view from Monocle of a list of RPC
dependencies (note: NIWS Client reference in the figure is
Netflix Internal Web Service Framework, referred to as RPC
Client throughout the paper [20]). Note how the commands
that are not configured with fallbacks are shown as not being
safe to fail. We use heuristics such as the presence of a
configured fallback and telemetry data that shows that the
fallback has succeeded when executed. When accessing this
view, users have the ability to toggle back-and-forth between
viewing all of the Hystrix commands for a cluster or viewing
all the RPC dependencies for a cluster.
VII. EXPERIMENT GENERATION
Monocle is also responsible for generating experiments
automatically. Today, Monocle generates fault injection exper-
iments for dependencies (RPC clients and Hystrix commands).
It generates three types:
• Failure
• Latency just below configured timeout (highest timeout -
P99 latency over the past 7 days + 5% buffer)
• Latency causing failure (highest configured timeout + 5%
buffer)
Monocle uses heuristics to try to identify the experiments
with the highest likelihood of finding a vulnerability.
A. Criticality score
Monocle assigns a criticality score to each dependency,
which is used as input for prioritizing experiments. We are
interested in prioritizing experiments on the more critical
dependencies sooner and more frequently because these are
the ones that we believe will cause the most harm if they
behave incorrectly.
Beyond direct experimentation; we have also discussed
using scores to generate a list of critical dependencies. That
list could be used to identify and prioritize reliability work for
our most critical components.
The criticality score is the product of the following four
values:
1) dependency priority (RPC client→ 1, Hystrix command
→ 100)
2) maximum percentage of inbound requests that trigger
the dependency over the past 7 days as compared to
all of the dependencies in the cluster (< 0.1% → 0, <
1%→ 10, < 10%→ 100,≤ 100%→ 1000)
3) retry factor (1 + configured number of retries)
4) number of interactions associated with the dependency
(if the dependency is an RPC Client, this would be
the number of Hystrix commands, if it is a Hystrix
command, this would be the number of RPC Clients)
Hystrix commands are prioritized over RPC clients because
Hystrix commands wrap RPC client calls, and we want to
verify that the Hystrix fallbacks are working correctly first.
B. Prioritization score
Monocle calculates a score for each experiment as a the
product of:
1) criticality score (see above)
2) safety score (safe → +1, unsafe → −1)
3) experiment weight4 (failure → 3, latency → 2, latency
causing failure → 1)
Monocle assigns a safety score of -1 to any experiment that
it deems as unsafe. This includes situations such as:
• Dependency being experimented on has been blacklisted
(no experiment types should be created for this depen-
dency)
• Dependency data associated with the experiment has been
not been recently collected, and does not have up-to-date
information
• Dependency being experimented on contains a critical
vulnerability and no experiment types should be created.
For example, the dependency is an unwrapped RPC
Client (no Hystrix command)
• Dependency has a known impact associated with its
failure (added by a user and directly related to a key
performance indicator: SPS, downloads per second, login,
or signup)
• Experiment being created is a latency experiment, and
the dependency is both missing fallbacks and requires
timeout tuning
• Experiment being created is a failure experiment and the
dependency is not safe to fail due to a missing fallback
Monocle computes scores for all possible experiments and
the resulting score represents whether a test is safe to run
(i.e., scores > 0 are safe). For the current use cases, there
is not much need for scores of unsafe experiments except
for debugging. This is an implementation detail, and another
option would be to pre-process the experiments and identify
safety before scoring them.
Monocle then runs the experiments in priority order. Only
experiments which have a positive score will be run. When
going through the prioritized list, Monocle checks if the
experiment should run by ensuring
• The experiment is not already running
• The experiment is not in a failed state (it has previously
failed and has not been looked at by a user)
• The experiment has not been run in the last (configured
number) of days
4This is a simplification, we actually flip the weights if the score is negative
in order to maintain the ordering of the experiments.
Fig. 8. A Hystrix metric graph that shows elevated threadpool rejections for
the canary group
VIII. RESULTS
To date, experiments generated by Monocle have revealed
several cases where timeouts were set incorrectly and fallbacks
revealed the service to be more business critical than the
owner had intended. Fig. 8 shows an example of an interaction
problem that can arise between a Hystrix command’s timeout
configuration and its threadpool size. In this experiment, about
900 ms of latency is injected into a Hystrix command to mimic
the scenario of a downstream dependency going latent.
The increase in the countThreadPoolRejected metric in-
dicates that the work could not be scheduled to a thread
because all of the threads in the threadpool are blocked,
resulting in the Hystrix command serving a fallback. This leads
to a short-circuiting behavior where the Hystrix command
unconditionally serves fallbacks for a period of time.
The revealed problem is that the timeout is too high relative
to the size of the threadpool. In this particular case, the
configured timeout was much higher than the 99th percentile
latency reported by our telemetry system, and so the solution
was to decrease the timeout accordingly.
IX. CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED
A. Failure modeling
The existing tooling limits the type of faults that we can
inject into the system. In particular, FIT can only cause
one type of error per injection point, but there are often
multiple ways that a service can fail. For example, we had
a situation where we ran an experiment by injecting failure
into a particular service. The injected fault behaved as if the
service returned an error. The experiment showed that the
system could handle this failure gracefully. However, we had
an incident where none of the servers associated with that
service were registered in our service discovery mechanism.
B. Application-based fault injection
Netflix implements fault injection using defined injection
points in Java-based platform libraries. These libraries are
common to all Netflix applications. Deploying new libraries
can take many months, as we have to wait for all of the
services to pick them up.
Historically, applications in the Netflix control plane have
been Java-based. However, the trend inside of Netflix is
to move towards more support for polyglot, most notably
JavaScript running on Node.js. This makes an application-
based approach challenging because we need to implement
new libraries for each supported language.
There are alternative approaches which do fault injection
out-of-process, obviating the need for language-specific bind-
ings. Istio [22] is one example of a service mesh based
approach to fault injection.
C. Even if you build it, they might not come
When ChAP was first made available for internal users, we
only had a few teams making regular use of the service. While
we strove to make the interface as simple as possible for new
users, running an experiment on production traffic is itself a
complex task, and there is a limit as to how much we can
possibly simplify the interface to support this. We employed a
consulting model with internal teams who would make good
candidates for potential users, but we did not see widespread
usage.
D. Challenge of automation
Our alternate approach to the self-serve model, automati-
cally generating the experiments ourselves, presented its own
set of challenges. We needed to develop heuristics to determine
which types of faults could be injected which were not known
to cause customer impact. This was necessarily a smaller
space of faults then if we have domain knowledge about the
individual services.
In addition, we had to ensure that we had a low false positive
rate, otherwise the service teams would lose confidence in the
results of the experiments. This meant that if an automatically
generated ChAP experiment revealed a potential vulnerability,
a member of the Resilience Engineering team had to spend
time analyzing the results of the experiment to verify that it
did, in fact, reveal a genuine vulnerability. This was generally
a time-consuming and tedious process. It is possible to build
supplementary tooling to reduce the effort involved in doing
the analysis, but that itself requires an additional investment.
E. Small sub-populations
Small sub-populations are a challenge to deal with. Netflix
software runs a variety of different types of devices, and these
devices behave differently. A problem might only manifest
on, say, a particular brand of Smart TV. If only a tiny fraction
of our userbase watches Netflix on this type of television,
then even if these users can’t stream video at all, it’s unlikely
to be detected by looking at total SPS success counts. We
could potentially oversample from device types that are less
common, but this means that we are increasing the blast radius
for that device type, which we have been reluctant to do.
F. Error counts
Although intuitively error rates seem like a reliable signal
for identifying problems with the system, we found them to
have some undesirable properties for use as an experimental
measure.
Error counts can help with the small sub-population issue,
because error counts are generally quite low, so even a smaller
sub-population may end up contributing significantly to the
error rate. However, this creates the opposite problem: a single
device in the baseline or canary group can cause a significant
increase in the error count if the device keeps erroring over
and over. This means that if an error-prone device happens
by chance to be assigned to a baseline or error group, it can
generate a spurious error signal.
In particular, for our automatic stop safety mechanism, we
had to substantially increase the threshold which we trigger a
stop on the error metrics because of how noisy they were.
G. Value of visualization
To be able to automatically generate experiments, we
needed to build tooling to obtain visibility into the config-
uration and observed behavior of RPC clients and Hystrix
commands. While this information has always been available
within Netflix through telemetry or configuration endpoints,
it had not previously been aggregated and displayed, which
proved useful for surfacing vulnerabilities and interactions
even without using this data for automatic experiment genera-
tion. For example, by integrating this information into a single
view, we were able to identify some cases of inconsistently
configured Hystrix and RPC client timeouts without even
needing to run a ChAP experiment.
X. CONCLUSION
Our work demonstrates that it is possible to automatically
and safely generate and run chaos experiments. These experi-
ments have identified vulnerabilities that could lead to outages
if left untreated.
While the original goal for ChAP was to run fault injection
experiments, we have discovered that the platform itself can
be used for other types of experiments. We are currently
extending ChAP to support load testing experiments, similar in
spirit to RedLiner [23]. In addition, some self-serve users have
begun experimenting with using ChAP for canary deployments
[2], because of the additional analysis that ChAP provides.
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